orchestration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an architect-implementer pattern where a primary agent processes and acts upon content generated by sub-agents, creating an attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The Architect agent ingests code diffs, implementation reports, and verification results from
codex-implementerandfable-implementerinto its active context as described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The "spec contract" provides a structured format for delegation, but the skill lacks explicit instructions to treat sub-agent output as untrusted or to delimit it from system-level instructions.
- Capability inventory: The Architect agent is instructed to "re-run the verification command" (command execution) and "read the diff" (file system interaction), which are capabilities that can be exploited by malicious sub-agent output.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, filtering, or validation logic for verification commands suggested by sub-agents before they are executed by the Architect.
Audit Metadata