orchestration

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute several shell scripts for installation, verification, and runtime inspection.
  • Evidence: It uses plugins/sol-advisor/scripts/install-agents.sh to modify agent profiles and inspect-agent-runtime.sh to query metadata from other session thread IDs.
  • These scripts are located outside the skill's own directory, suggesting a dependency on an external repository structure.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates an indirect prompt injection surface by delegating tasks to sub-agents and processing their 'Implementation Reports' as authoritative claims.
  • Evidence: The workflow in role-contracts.md involves the primary session reading and acting upon structured reports from sub-agents, which could contain malicious instructions or misleading diffs.
  • Ingestion point: references/role-contracts.md (Implementation reports)
  • Boundary markers: Structured implementation report format (STATUS, OBJECTIVE, CHANGES, etc.)
  • Capability inventory: Shell script execution (sh ...), git commands, agent spawning (agent_type)
  • Sanitization: Parent session is instructed to inspect diffs and rerun verification, but the initial evaluation is based on sub-agent output.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses non-standard model identifiers and elaborate role-playing constraints to manage agent transitions.
  • Evidence: The instructions refer to 'GPT-5.6 Sol', 'GPT-5.6 Luna', and 'GPT-5.6 Terra', which are not standard model versions. This naming convention and the associated 'preflight' checks may conflict with the agent's actual system prompt or security guidelines.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 18, 2026, 10:54 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — orchestration