orchestration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute several shell scripts for installation, verification, and runtime inspection.
- Evidence: It uses
plugins/sol-advisor/scripts/install-agents.shto modify agent profiles andinspect-agent-runtime.shto query metadata from other session thread IDs. - These scripts are located outside the skill's own directory, suggesting a dependency on an external repository structure.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates an indirect prompt injection surface by delegating tasks to sub-agents and processing their 'Implementation Reports' as authoritative claims.
- Evidence: The workflow in
role-contracts.mdinvolves the primary session reading and acting upon structured reports from sub-agents, which could contain malicious instructions or misleading diffs. - Ingestion point:
references/role-contracts.md(Implementation reports) - Boundary markers: Structured implementation report format (STATUS, OBJECTIVE, CHANGES, etc.)
- Capability inventory: Shell script execution (
sh ...), git commands, agent spawning (agent_type) - Sanitization: Parent session is instructed to inspect diffs and rerun verification, but the initial evaluation is based on sub-agent output.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses non-standard model identifiers and elaborate role-playing constraints to manage agent transitions.
- Evidence: The instructions refer to 'GPT-5.6 Sol', 'GPT-5.6 Luna', and 'GPT-5.6 Terra', which are not standard model versions. This naming convention and the associated 'preflight' checks may conflict with the agent's actual system prompt or security guidelines.
Audit Metadata