credentials-vault
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to access and manage highly sensitive files stored in the user's home directory at
~/.claude/projects/{project-path}/credentials.envand~/.claude/shared-credentials.env. These files contain plain-text API keys, database passwords, and authentication tokens, which constitute a high-value target for data exposure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted input from users or external project configurations and treats them as credentials, creating a vulnerability surface for injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: User-provided passwords, API keys, and tokens ingested via the vault's read and write procedures (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions mandate masking sensitive values in console output and using double-quoted strings for file storage.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
catfor reading secrets, aWrite/Edittool for modifying credential files, andchmodfor permission management. It also facilitates using these credentials in shell commands (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill provides logic for escaping special characters (
",\,$) and warns that single quotes must be used in shell contexts to prevent payload interpretation, though it remains vulnerable to sophisticated injection payloads provided as "credentials." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to interact with the filesystem, including
catfor retrieving secrets,chmod 600for hardening file permissions, and the execution of a local validation script (scripts/validate.sh). - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill establishes a persistence mechanism by storing long-lived authentication data in the hidden
~/.claude/directory, which allows credentials to persist across agent sessions and projects.
Audit Metadata