te-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for the agent to download and execute a binary installer from an external CDN (specifically
https://cdn.tabulareditor.com/files/cli/latest/te-linux-x64.tar.gz). This allows for the installation and execution of arbitrary code within the agent's runtime environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation guide directs the agent to modify its persistent shell configuration files (e.g.,
~/.bashrcand~/.zshrc) to add the binary directory to the systemPATH. This is a classic persistence mechanism used to ensure tools remain active across sessions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill identifies and describes the exact paths where sensitive service principal tokens and credential caches are stored, such as
~/.te-cli/token-cache.binand~/.te-cli/. This information simplifies the discovery and potential exfiltration of credentials. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions to fetch configuration and binary data from non-whitelisted external domains, such as
cdn.tabulareditor.com. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function includes managing 'CustomInstructions' metadata within semantic models. This metadata is specifically intended to override or guide AI behavior, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the model data is sourced from an untrusted or compromised environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata