datex-studio-shared
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: A URL referenced in 'report-authoring/design-standards.md' (https://design.datexuniversity.com/Content/Guidelines/Print_reports.htm) has been flagged as malicious by automated security scanners (URL:Blacklist). This file was also flagged by anti-virus scanners as potentially infected (MD:HttpRequest-inf).
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions in 'report-authoring/cli-commands.md' to install external packages, including '@anthropic-ai/agent-browser' and '@mescius/activereportsjs'. While the former is from a trusted organization, the installation of unversioned third-party packages at runtime represents a remote code execution surface.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file 'studio-management.md' contains a Python one-liner ('python -c') used to programmatically identify and terminate a running process by reading a PID from a local lockfile ('~/.datex/studio.lock'). This is a dynamic execution pattern used for service lifecycle management.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple files contain instructions for executing CLI commands ('dxs') that interact with the file system and network, including authentication, repository listing, and report uploading. This represents the primary functional surface of the skill.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In 'report-authoring/cli-commands.md', the skill instructs the user to run 'agent-browser install' after installing the npm package. This triggers secondary installation steps from a remote source.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 infected file(s) detected - DO NOT USE
- AI detected serious security threats
- Contains 2 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata