research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied categories or questions by interpolating them directly into templates used for subagent prompts without proper boundary markers or sanitization. This allows a user to potentially override the subagent's intended research behavior.
- Ingestion points: The user-supplied
<app category or question>from theargument-hintinSKILL.mdis used to fill the[one-line idea]and[the question]fields in the subagent brief. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate the user-provided data from the system-level instructions in the subagent brief.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for web searching, writing to the local file system (docs/research/), and calling external tools like
cloneandapp-brief. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the data entering the subagent prompt.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to 'Turn each [U] (unverified finding) that a decision depends on into a test before you trust it (a probe script, a self-test step in tools/selftest.ps1)'. This encourages the agent to generate and potentially execute local scripts based on unverified information gathered from the web during the research phase.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of external tools, such as
clonefor opening reference applications, and references the modification and use of PowerShell scripts (tools/selftest.ps1).
Audit Metadata