enable-semantic-search

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs a global installation of the qmd tool directly from an unverified GitHub repository (github:tobi/qmd). Installing and running code from personal repositories allows for arbitrary code execution with the user's system privileges.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local JavaScript files (scan-vault.cjs and check-availability.cjs) assumed to exist within the user's vault. These scripts are not part of the skill's distributed code, making their behavior unverifiable. Additionally, the skill modifies sensitive configuration files like ~/.claude.json to register MCP servers.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and executes the Bun runtime installer from a remote source (https://bun.sh/install) via a pipe to bash. While the source is a well-known service, this method is a high-risk operation that bypasses traditional package verification. It also downloads approximately 2GB of AI models from HuggingFace.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its vault scanning feature.
  • Ingestion points: Vault files processed by the scan-vault.cjs script.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent treats the scanner's JSON output as trusted data for configuration.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands for tool installation (bun, brew) and index management (qmd).
  • Sanitization: Absent; metadata and paths extracted from the vault are interpolated directly into command arguments and configuration files.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 20, 2026, 12:41 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — enable-semantic-search