skills/davekilleen/dex/todoist-setup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

todoist-setup

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill configures and runs an external package from a public registry at runtime.
  • Evidence: The setup flow adds a command to .mcp.json that uses npx -y todoist-mcp-server to fetch and execute the server code.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on a remote package from the npm registry that is not from a verified trusted organization.
  • Evidence: Reference to todoist-mcp-server in the MCP configuration step.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles sensitive authentication tokens and persists them in multiple local configuration files.
  • Evidence: The skill prompts for a Todoist API token and writes it to both System/integrations/config.yaml and .mcp.json under the env section.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to validate connectivity to the external service.
  • Evidence: Execution of curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" https://api.todoist.com/api/v1/projects to test the token.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted task data from an external API.
  • Ingestion points: Task titles and descriptions fetched from Todoist via the todoist-mcp-server or curl calls.
  • Boundary markers: Uses a [dex:task-ID] marker for loop prevention, but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the model to ignore embedded commands in task data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (npx, curl) and modify local configuration files.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the task content retrieved from the Todoist API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 20, 2026, 12:41 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — todoist-setup