asana-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon data from Asana tasks and projects, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from external sources using tools like
ASANA_GET_A_TASK,ASANA_SEARCH_TASKS_IN_WORKSPACE, andASANA_GET_TASKS_FROM_A_PROJECT. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to the agent regarding the use of delimiters to separate data from instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore commands embedded in task content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to sensitive capabilities, including listing all workspace users (
ASANA_GET_USERS_FOR_WORKSPACE) and executing batch operations (ASANA_SUBMIT_PARALLEL_REQUESTS). - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization or validation logic for the content retrieved from the Asana API.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration requires the connection to an external MCP server.
- Evidence: Setup instructions require adding
https://rube.app/mcpas a remote MCP server in the client configuration to enable the Asana tools.
Audit Metadata