bulkpublish-social-scheduling
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
upload_mediatool accepts afilePathparameter, granting the agent the capability to read arbitrary files from the local filesystem and upload them to BulkPublish's remote infrastructure. This configuration presents a high risk of data exfiltration if the agent is manipulated into reading sensitive files such as SSH keys, environment variables, or configuration files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's setup instructions direct the user to execute
npx -y @bulkpublish/mcp-server. This command downloads and runs code directly from the npm registry, representing an external code execution vector. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to a hosted Model Context Protocol (MCP) server at
https://mcp.bulkpublish.com/mcpand references external documentation and API specifications atapp.bulkpublish.com. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external social media platforms via analytics tools and media URLs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through
get_analytics,get_post_metrics, andupload_media(via URL). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in social media content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-read capabilities (
upload_media), network operations (create_post,publish_post), and analytic reading. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation of external content before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata