confluence-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the user to add an external MCP server configuration from
https://rube.app/mcpto access the Confluence toolkit. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Confluence, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: External content enters the agent's context through tools such as
CONFLUENCE_GET_PAGE_BY_ID,CONFLUENCE_SEARCH_CONTENT, andCONFLUENCE_CQL_SEARCHas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill body lacks instructions for the agent to use specific delimiters or to disregard instructions embedded within the retrieved Confluence content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides significant modification capabilities, including
CONFLUENCE_CREATE_PAGE,CONFLUENCE_UPDATE_PAGE, andCONFLUENCE_DELETE_PAGE(referenced inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no description of content sanitization or validation processes for the data fetched from Confluence before it is utilized by the agent.
Audit Metadata