ops-doctor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!commandsyntax inSKILL.mdto execute${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-doctorat load time. This allows the skill to dynamically populate its context with the output of a local shell command before user interaction. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing data from several local sources.
- Ingestion points: Reads contents of
preferences.json,daemon-health.json,plugin.json, andregistry.jsonvia theReadtool, as well as the output of theops-doctorbinary. - Boundary markers: None identified. The diagnostic JSON is interpolated directly into the
Agentprompt without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(command execution),Agent(sub-agent spawning), andWebFetch(network operations). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested data before it is passed to the sub-agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bashto execute diagnostic scripts andcatto read configuration files. It specifically instructs the agent to verify the "secret resolution chain" which involves checking environment variables and secret management tools like Doppler. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While not performing explicit exfiltration to unknown domains, the skill uses the
WebFetchtool to interact with external APIs (e.g., Linear) to test connectivity. This capability, combined with the reading ofpreferences.jsonand sensitive environment variables, represents a potential data exposure path if manipulated by malicious diagnostic data.
Audit Metadata