ops-marketing
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
setupcommand performs broad scanning of sensitive local files to harvest credentials. It targets shell profiles (~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc,~/.zprofile,~/.envrc) to extract API keys and tokens. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes code to query the Google Chrome browser history database (
~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/History) usingsqlite3to auto-detect marketing platforms and account identities, which is a highly invasive data exposure pattern. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
setuproutine attempts to extract secrets from multiple password managers and local stores, including Dashlane (dcli), Doppler CLI, and the macOS Keychain (security find-generic-password). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to executecurlcommands and shell scripts that interpolate numerous environment variables and configuration values, increasing the risk of command injection if these variables are not strictly controlled. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
optimizecommand spawns a sub-agent (claude-sonnet-4-5) and instructs it to read pre-gathered data from external APIs (Meta, Google Ads, Klaviyo). This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious content embedded in marketing campaigns or API responses could influence the behavior of the sub-agent. - Ingestion points: External API responses from Klaviyo, Meta Graph API, Google Analytics Data API, and Google Search Console API.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions for the sub-agent or the data processing scripts.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents have access to the
Bash,Agent, andTeamCreatetools. - Sanitization: The skill uses
jqto extract values but does not perform content sanitization or validation before passing data to the optimizer agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata