ops-merge
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the dynamic injection syntax
!to execute${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/ops-merge-scanat skill load time, which performs a repository scan before any user interaction occurs. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to harvest sensitive credentials from the
$GITHUB_TOKENenvironment variable and by executingdoppler secrets get GITHUB_TOKEN --plainthrough a password manager. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted PR review comments and treats them as instructions for fixer agents.
- Ingestion points: PR comments are retrieved via
gh api repos/<repo>/pulls/<number>/commentsin Phase 3. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or explicit instructions to treat the fetched comments as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The fixer agents have access to the
Bash,Edit, andWritetools, enabling them to modify the codebase based on the input. - Sanitization: No filtering, validation, or sanitization of the comment content is performed before addressing the comments in the code.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes high-privilege repository commands including
git push --force-with-leaseandgh pr merge --admin, which can lead to significant changes in the target repositories if misused.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata