Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents through various extraction tools such as pypdf, pdfplumber, pdftotext, and pytesseract, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PDF files are read and processed across multiple scripts including
scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, andscripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
forms.mdandSKILL.mddo not include explicit prompt boundary markers or directives to ignore instructions embedded within the extracted text. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files, execute shell commands (via tools like qpdf and pdftotext), and generate images.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from PDFs before it is presented to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms runtime monkeypatching of a third-party library to modify its behavior. - Evidence: The function
monkeypatch_pydpf_method()dynamically replacespypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedwith a custom implementation. While this is used to work around a specific bug inpypdfversion 5.7.0, it constitutes dynamic modification of executable code at runtime.
Audit Metadata