slack-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface because it ingests untrusted data from Slack and has the capability to perform write operations within the workspace.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from Slack via
SLACK_SEARCH_MESSAGES,SLACK_FETCH_CONVERSATION_HISTORY, andSLACK_FETCH_MESSAGE_THREAD_FROM_A_CONVERSATIONas described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific safety warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the retrieved Slack messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute actions including
SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE,SLACK_UPDATES_A_SLACK_MESSAGE,SLACK_SCHEDULE_MESSAGE, andSLACK_ADD_REACTION_TO_AN_ITEM(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping Slack content before it is processed or used to generate new messages.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the configuration of an external MCP server endpoint (
https://rube.app/mcp) and references documentation from Composio (composio.dev). These external services provide the underlying tool schemas and execution environment for the Slack automation tasks.
Audit Metadata