slack-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface because it ingests untrusted data from Slack and has the capability to perform write operations within the workspace.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from Slack via SLACK_SEARCH_MESSAGES, SLACK_FETCH_CONVERSATION_HISTORY, and SLACK_FETCH_MESSAGE_THREAD_FROM_A_CONVERSATION as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific safety warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the retrieved Slack messages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute actions including SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE, SLACK_UPDATES_A_SLACK_MESSAGE, SLACK_SCHEDULE_MESSAGE, and SLACK_ADD_REACTION_TO_AN_ITEM (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping Slack content before it is processed or used to generate new messages.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the configuration of an external MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) and references documentation from Composio (composio.dev). These external services provide the underlying tool schemas and execution environment for the Slack automation tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 09:46 PM