vercel-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted external data that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read build and runtime logs via
VERCEL_GET_DEPLOYMENT_LOGSandVERCEL_GET_RUNTIME_LOGSinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided in
SKILL.mdto the agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within these logs. - Capability inventory: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mddescribes significant write operations, including adding environment variables (VERCEL_ADD_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE), creating DNS records (VERCEL_CREATE_DNS_RECORD), and triggering deployments (VERCEL_CREATE_NEW_DEPLOYMENT). - Sanitization: There are no instructions in
SKILL.mdfor the agent to sanitize or validate the content of the logs before using that information to perform subsequent actions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires connection to an external MCP server to fetch tool schemas and perform platform operations.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mddirect users to addhttps://rube.app/mcpas an MCP server. This endpoint provides the underlying tool definition for the Vercel automation tasks.
Audit Metadata