ci-fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub Actions logs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The commands
gh run view <run-id> --log-failedandgh run download <run-id>inSKILL.mdingest logs from external workflow runs. These logs may contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's next steps if a failure was triggered by an untrusted actor (e.g., a pull request from a fork). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific warnings to the agent to treat the log content as non-authoritative data.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes commands to modify the repository, such as
git commit,git push, andgh run rerun. A successful injection could leverage these to push unauthorized code or exfiltrate environment details. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, sanitization, or validation of the log content before it is processed by the agent to 'Identify Root Cause'.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several high-capability CLI tools to interact with the repository and CI environment.
- The skill uses
gh(GitHub CLI) to view PRs, download artifacts, and rerun jobs. - The skill uses
gitto stage changes (git add -A), commit code, and push to remote branches (git push). While these are necessary for the skill's primary purpose, they represent a significant capability surface if the agent is influenced by malicious input.
Audit Metadata