ci-fix

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub Actions logs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The commands gh run view <run-id> --log-failed and gh run download <run-id> in SKILL.md ingest logs from external workflow runs. These logs may contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's next steps if a failure was triggered by an untrusted actor (e.g., a pull request from a fork).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific warnings to the agent to treat the log content as non-authoritative data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes commands to modify the repository, such as git commit, git push, and gh run rerun. A successful injection could leverage these to push unauthorized code or exfiltrate environment details.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, sanitization, or validation of the log content before it is processed by the agent to 'Identify Root Cause'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several high-capability CLI tools to interact with the repository and CI environment.
  • The skill uses gh (GitHub CLI) to view PRs, download artifacts, and rerun jobs.
  • The skill uses git to stage changes (git add -A), commit code, and push to remote branches (git push). While these are necessary for the skill's primary purpose, they represent a significant capability surface if the agent is influenced by malicious input.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ci-fix