code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the git repository (including diffs, commit messages, and external issue descriptions) and interpolates them directly into prompts for sub-agents. A malicious actor could embed adversarial instructions in a pull request, commit history, or issue tracker to influence the agent's behavior during the review process.
- Ingestion points:
git diffoutput,git logoutput, and content fetched viadocs/agents/issue-tracker.mdor files in.scratch/. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when passing diff or spec content to the sub-agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes
gitcommands and reads local repository files. - Sanitization: No sanitization of the diff or spec content is specified before it is interpolated into the natural language prompts for the sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands (
git diff,git rev-parse,git log) using a user-supplied "fixed point" (e.g., a branch name or commit hash). While these are standard git operations for this context, the user-controlled input flows into a shell command string, which is a common pattern for command injection vulnerabilities if the platform does not properly sanitize shell arguments.
Audit Metadata