dvc-ml-workflow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts scripts/init-dvc-project.sh and scripts/queue-helper.sh use shell execution methods that are susceptible to command injection. Specifically, init-dvc-project.sh utilizes eval "$@" in its run function, and queue-helper.sh performs unquoted variable expansion (dvc exp run --queue $flags). These patterns could allow for the execution of arbitrary commands if the agent is manipulated into passing malicious strings as parameters (e.g., through untrusted data sources).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-controlled configuration files and CLI arguments without robust sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Project configuration files (params.yaml, dvc.yaml) and command-line arguments passed to the queue-helper.sh and init-dvc-project.sh scripts.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use explicit delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the configuration files or parameters.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and modify the local filesystem via the DVC CLI and the bundled bash scripts.
  • Sanitization: The bash scripts lack sanitization for shell metacharacters in input parameters, relying on standard shell expansion which is vulnerable to injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 30, 2026, 08:35 PM