dvc-ml-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts
scripts/init-dvc-project.shandscripts/queue-helper.shuse shell execution methods that are susceptible to command injection. Specifically,init-dvc-project.shutilizeseval "$@"in itsrunfunction, andqueue-helper.shperforms unquoted variable expansion (dvc exp run --queue $flags). These patterns could allow for the execution of arbitrary commands if the agent is manipulated into passing malicious strings as parameters (e.g., through untrusted data sources). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-controlled configuration files and CLI arguments without robust sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Project configuration files (
params.yaml,dvc.yaml) and command-line arguments passed to thequeue-helper.shandinit-dvc-project.shscripts. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use explicit delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the configuration files or parameters.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and modify the local filesystem via the DVC CLI and the bundled bash scripts.
- Sanitization: The bash scripts lack sanitization for shell metacharacters in input parameters, relying on standard shell expansion which is vulnerable to injection.
Audit Metadata