fastapi-ai-scaffold
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The scaffolded application processes untrusted user data through an LLM, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: User messages are ingested via the
PredictInandChatInschemas in the generatedapp/api/v1/inference.py.tmplfile.\n - Boundary markers: The
validate_with_retryfunction inapp/ml/guardrails.py.tmpllacks robust delimiters or explicit 'ignore' instructions when re-injecting validation errors (which may contain user-supplied content) back into the prompt for correction.\n - Capability inventory: The generated service utilizes
SQLModelfor database access,httpx.AsyncClientfor external API calls, and local file access for model loading.\n - Sanitization: Input length and content existence checks are implemented in
app/ml/guardrails.py.tmplvia thecheck_inputfunction.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a project generation script (scripts/new-fastapi-ai-service.sh) that executes shell commands.\n - Evidence: The script uses
mkdir,cp, andsedto build the target project structure. It implements slug sanitization to mitigate command injection risks intosed, but it facilitates the execution of local shell operations during the scaffolding process.
Audit Metadata