triage

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from issue and PR bodies, comments, and diffs (Step 1 in SKILL.md). This external content is used to inform agent actions without specified boundary markers or sanitization protocols to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the triage items.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Step 1) reads issue/PR body, comments, and labels.
  • Boundary markers: Not present; the agent is instructed to 'Read the full issue or PR' without delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can write comments, apply labels, close issues, write markdown files to the .out-of-scope/ directory, and execute shell commands/tests.
  • Sanitization: Not present; the skill does not define rules for filtering or escaping input from the issue tracker.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The triage workflow includes a verification step (Step 3 in SKILL.md) that requires the agent to 'check it out, run the relevant tests or commands' from a pull request diff. This involves executing code provided by external, potentially untrusted contributors.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instruction to run tests and commands provided within an external pull request constitutes dynamic execution of untrusted source code as part of the triage verification process.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's verification process involves checking out and running code from external contributors (pull requests), which is functionally equivalent to downloading and executing remote scripts from untrusted sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — triage