dispatch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses emphatic and absolute directives to override the agent's default behavior and tool selection. Specifically, it uses markers like "IMPORTANT: READ VERY CLOSELY" and "! NEVER bail to inline execution
- if you are about to /execute, STOP." to constrain the agent's autonomy and prevent the use of specific tools (like
/execute) outside the skill's defined workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests external data in the form of uncommitted working trees produced by subprocess "workers". This creates a potential surface where malicious instructions embedded in the code or reports generated by these workers could influence the orchestrating agent's next actions.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
worktree import --from-worktreeto bring worker-modified files into the coordination worktree. - Boundary markers: The instructions emphasize a "verify beat" and a "sole writer" posture, though these are behavioral rather than technical delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful CLI tools including
git,dispatch,doctrine, andslicefor file system and repository management. - Sanitization: The skill prescribes
doctrine check prove(linting and formatting checks) as a gate to halt the import of defective worker deltas. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill relies on the execution of multiple CLI tools (
git,dispatch,doctrine,slice) to manage worktrees, commits, and verification suites. The orchestration of subprocesses via/dispatch-spawnis a central capability.
Audit Metadata