ask-then-build
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest user answers and feature ideas, which are then used to update authoritative project documentation (such as ADRs, requirements, and READMEs) and to generate a 'concise paragraph prompt' for another AI agent. This creates a pathway where malicious instructions provided by a user could be stored in a trusted file or executed by a subsequent agent in a pipeline.
- Ingestion points: User responses to scoping questions provided in Phase 1.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the LLM to treat the user-provided content as data rather than instructions when generating the final build prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file-write operations to update repository documentation.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of user input before it is interpolated into project documents or the final agent prompt.
Audit Metadata