browser-harness
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation guide in
references/install.mdinstructs the user or agent to execute a remote script viacurl -fsSL https://browser-use.com/profile.sh | sh. This 'curl pipe to shell' pattern allows for arbitrary code execution from an external source without prior verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a CLI tool (
browser-harness) to execute arbitrary Python code blocks provided in the instructions. This tool has the capability to start daemons, manage local/remote browser sessions, and interact with the file system (e.g., writing to/tmp/extracted.txt). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary design is to access and extract data from 'login-walled' and authenticated browser sessions (e.g., LinkedIn, X/Twitter). This capability allows the agent to access sensitive user cookies, personal information, and private communications if directed to do so.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process content from third-party websites.
- Ingestion points: Reads arbitrary web page content via
js(innerText) and visual data viacapture_screenshotas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions; untrusted content is processed directly.
- Capability inventory: Includes file writing (
with open(...) as f: f.write(text)), network requests (http_get), and full browser control via CDP. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, sanitization, or escaping of the content extracted from external websites.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata