skills/davidondrej/skills/deepapi/Gen Agent Trust Hub

deepapi

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to implement a self-update routine by fetching a new version of its instruction file from https://deepapi.co/deepapi-skill/SKILL.md and overwriting the local file when versions differ.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By directing the agent to overwrite its local instruction set with content fetched from a remote URL, the skill facilitates a vector for remote instruction injection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To retrieve credentials, the instructions require the agent to execute shell commands that source local configuration files, specifically source ~/.deepapi/env for bash/zsh and . "$HOME/.deepapi/env.ps1" for PowerShell.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly targets sensitive credential files located in the user's home directory (~/.deepapi/env) to obtain API keys and environment variables.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is exposed to indirect prompt injection risks due to its core function of scraping untrusted data from multiple social media platforms and web searches.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple endpoints for scraping LinkedIn, GitHub, X/Twitter, and general websites.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific guidelines to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the scraped data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to send emails, post to X/Twitter, and deploy web pages using content retrieved from external sources.
  • Sanitization: No explicit validation, filtering, or sanitization steps are provided for the agent to perform on the ingested content before downstream processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 27, 2026, 03:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — deepapi