deepapi
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to implement a self-update routine by fetching a new version of its instruction file from
https://deepapi.co/deepapi-skill/SKILL.mdand overwriting the local file when versions differ. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By directing the agent to overwrite its local instruction set with content fetched from a remote URL, the skill facilitates a vector for remote instruction injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To retrieve credentials, the instructions require the agent to execute shell commands that source local configuration files, specifically
source ~/.deepapi/envfor bash/zsh and. "$HOME/.deepapi/env.ps1"for PowerShell. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly targets sensitive credential files located in the user's home directory (
~/.deepapi/env) to obtain API keys and environment variables. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is exposed to indirect prompt injection risks due to its core function of scraping untrusted data from multiple social media platforms and web searches.
- Ingestion points: Multiple endpoints for scraping LinkedIn, GitHub, X/Twitter, and general websites.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific guidelines to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the scraped data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to send emails, post to X/Twitter, and deploy web pages using content retrieved from external sources.
- Sanitization: No explicit validation, filtering, or sanitization steps are provided for the agent to perform on the ingested content before downstream processing.
Audit Metadata