online-shopping

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions attempt to override system-level configurations by explicitly directing the agent or the platform environment not to use safety/invocation constraints such as disable-model-invocation or allow_implicit_invocation: false.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands (curl and uuidgen) to perform network requests and generate unique identifiers for API idempotency.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with an external service, deepapi.co, to perform web searches, scrape specific websites, and query social media data (Twitter) for research purposes.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data from arbitrary third-party websites and social media platforms.
  • Ingestion points: External content enters the agent's context through the responses of the deepapi.co API, specifically from the web search, website scraping, and Twitter search endpoints.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to use delimiters or specific safety markers to differentiate between the agent's instructions and the untrusted content retrieved from the web.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses network capabilities via curl and the ability to process and summarize complex external data.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, validation, or filtering processes for the data retrieved from external sources before it is analyzed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 12:08 PM