online-shopping
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions attempt to override system-level configurations by explicitly directing the agent or the platform environment not to use safety/invocation constraints such as
disable-model-invocationorallow_implicit_invocation: false. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands (
curlanduuidgen) to perform network requests and generate unique identifiers for API idempotency. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with an external service,
deepapi.co, to perform web searches, scrape specific websites, and query social media data (Twitter) for research purposes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data from arbitrary third-party websites and social media platforms.
- Ingestion points: External content enters the agent's context through the responses of the
deepapi.coAPI, specifically from the web search, website scraping, and Twitter search endpoints. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to use delimiters or specific safety markers to differentiate between the agent's instructions and the untrusted content retrieved from the web.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network capabilities via
curland the ability to process and summarize complex external data. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, validation, or filtering processes for the data retrieved from external sources before it is analyzed by the agent.
Audit Metadata