online-shopping
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill attempts to access a sensitive file path at
~/.deepapi/envto retrieve environment variables and API keys. Access to hidden configuration files in the user's home directory poses a data exposure risk. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Sensitive data obtained from the local environment file is transmitted to an external domain (
deepapi.co) as an authentication token in the request headers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes several network requests to the domain
deepapi.coto perform web searches and scrape external websites. This domain is not identified as a well-known or trusted service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands, including
sourcefor loading local configuration,curlfor interacting with the external API, anduuidgenfor creating idempotency keys. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its automated scraping capabilities.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context through web scraping (
/v1/scrape/website) and social media searches (/v1/scrape/twitter/search) as defined in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define any boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the scraped content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform network requests via
curland generate markdown responses based on the external data it retrieves. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, filtering, or validating the integrity of the content retrieved from external websites before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata