repo-sync
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install a binary from an external third-party source using Homebrew.
- Evidence:
brew install --cask vectal-labs/tap/repo-syncinSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands to manage services, modify plist files, and execute the third-party binary.
- Evidence: Calls to
repo-sync,/usr/bin/plutil, and/bin/launchctlare used to manage the lifecycle and configuration of the sync service. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill configures a macOS LaunchAgent to ensure the
repo-syncservice runs automatically at login. - Evidence: Instructions for managing
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vectal-labs.repo-sync.plistand usinglaunchctl bootstrapto ensure background execution across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and synchronize the contents of Git repositories, which could contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Git repositories added to the sync service (configured in
SKILL.mdandreferences/operations.md). - Boundary markers: None present to delimit repository content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write, network operations (git push/pull), and execution of shell commands via the
repo-syncbinary. - Sanitization: The skill mentions blocking specific filenames known to contain secrets (e.g.,
.env, private keys) but does not validate the content of the files themselves. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
repo-sync skill installcommand performs lateral movement by automatically copying the skill into multiple agent-specific directories. - Evidence: The skill attempts to install itself into
~/.agents/skills/repo-sync,~/.claude/skills, and~/.hermes/skills, which modifies the configuration environment of other AI agents.
Audit Metadata