signal-from-expert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to perform its workflow:
- Runs
python3 scripts/fetch-sources.pyto scrape external content. - Uses
cat -nto read both user corpus files and saved expert essays, exposing file contents and line numbers to the agent. - Performs filesystem operations including
cp assets/essays-AGENTS.md <repo>/essays/AGENTS.mdandln -sto create a symlink forCLAUDE.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch external content:
- Invokes
DeepAPIviaPOST /v1/search/webto find relevant essays based on search queries. - Scrapes full text from user-provided and search-discovered URLs using
DeepAPI's scraping capabilities. - Mentions using
curlfor ad-hoc network calls to handle proxy issues. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the web:
- Ingestion points: Scraped content from external URLs is saved to local
.mdfiles in theessays/directory. - Boundary markers: The workflow lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore any embedded commands or malicious instructions within the scraped content or the user's corpus.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
cat,python3,cp,ln) and read files based on the content it processes. - Sanitization: The skill performs basic stripping of "site layout junk" but does not perform rigorous sanitization or validation of the prose text before the agent reads it.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions direct the agent to load API keys by running
source ~/.deepapi/env, which involves reading credentials from a sensitive file path in the user's home directory.
Audit Metadata