run-upl-prompts

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download binary release artifacts for multiple architectures from the GitHub repository DavidValin/universal-prompt-language. These resources are owned by the skill author.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to install the downloaded binary using sudo install -m 0755 upl /usr/local/bin/upl. This requires administrative privileges to modify system directories. It also uses the CLI for prompt rendering via upl build-from-json.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The pattern of downloading a binary from a remote repository and subsequently executing it with system privileges constitutes a remote code execution risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recursively searches for and reads .upl and .txt files from local directories, parsing metadata fields (name, description) to influence agent behavior. This ingestion of untrusted local data represents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Recursive file search in ~/.upl/prompts or user-specified directories (e.g., find ~/.upl/prompts -type f).
  • Boundary markers: The skill contains a manual safety rule (Rule 20) advising the agent not to execute shell commands contained in prompt text, but no technical boundary markers or sanitization logic are defined in the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows file system discovery, temporary file writing, and arbitrary CLI execution via the upl binary.
  • Sanitization: None detected; the agent relies on the upl CLI's internal handling of parameters provided via JSON files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 05:34 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — run-upl-prompts