run-upl-prompts
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download binary release artifacts for multiple architectures from the GitHub repository
DavidValin/universal-prompt-language. These resources are owned by the skill author. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to install the downloaded binary using
sudo install -m 0755 upl /usr/local/bin/upl. This requires administrative privileges to modify system directories. It also uses the CLI for prompt rendering viaupl build-from-json. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The pattern of downloading a binary from a remote repository and subsequently executing it with system privileges constitutes a remote code execution risk.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recursively searches for and reads
.upland.txtfiles from local directories, parsing metadata fields (name,description) to influence agent behavior. This ingestion of untrusted local data represents a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Recursive file search in
~/.upl/promptsor user-specified directories (e.g.,find ~/.upl/prompts -type f). - Boundary markers: The skill contains a manual safety rule (Rule 20) advising the agent not to execute shell commands contained in prompt text, but no technical boundary markers or sanitization logic are defined in the instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows file system discovery, temporary file writing, and arbitrary CLI execution via the
uplbinary. - Sanitization: None detected; the agent relies on the
uplCLI's internal handling of parameters provided via JSON files.
Audit Metadata