agent-management
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external code from a remote repository.\n
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/23blocks-OS/ai-maestro-plugins.gitfound in SKILL.md.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a script downloaded from an external source.\n - Evidence:
./install-agent-cli.shexecution following thegit clonecommand in SKILL.md.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local shell scripts to perform sensitive operations.\n - Evidence: Commands such as
aimaestro-agent.sh create,aimaestro-agent.sh delete, andaimaestro-agent.sh plugin installare used for agent management.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an attack surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.\n - Ingestion points: Directory paths (
--dir), task descriptions (--task), configuration files (import <file>), and plugin marketplace sources (marketplace add <source>) specified in SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present.\n
- Capability inventory: File system modification, shell script execution, and plugin management via
aimaestro-agent.shacross all documented commands.\n - Sanitization: Absent. No evidence of input validation or content filtering for user-provided data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata