agent-memory-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The setup instructions require cloning a repository from an external, unknown source (
https://github.com/webzler/agentMemory.git) into the agent's local environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the download, the skill instructs the execution of
npm installandnpm run compileon the external codebase, which triggers the execution of scripts and dependency installations from that untrusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill runs a local MCP server and a dashboard using
npm run, which executes scripts defined in the external repository with access to the target workspace path provided by the user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides tools to search and read from a memory bank synced with project documentation. If a malicious actor places instructions within the project files being indexed, the agent may retrieve and execute these instructions during memory retrieval tasks.
- Ingestion points: The
memory_readandmemory_searchtools read data from the local memory bank (defined inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present; there are no instructions to the agent to disregard formatting or potential commands within the retrieved memory content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses filesystem read/write capabilities and the ability to start local servers via the MCP interface.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested memory content is provided.
Audit Metadata