agirails-agent-payments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill sets up an interactive protocol that ingests user inputs and inserts them into template blocks to generate code snippets, creating a potential surface for prompt or schema malformation.
- Ingestion points: User responses to the 11 onboarding questions in
SKILL.md(Step 2), such as agent names, capabilities, and budgets. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions or delimiters telling the agent to escape or isolate user input before inserting it into the code templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill doesn't perform automated tool execution; it acts strictly as an interactive code generator and informational reference.
- Sanitization: Basic alphanumeric validation is specified for the agent name and Ethereum address format, but other free-form fields lack detailed input sanitization instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The reference sections contain installation instructions directing users or agents to pull files from external endpoints.
- Evidence: Documented commands like
curl -sL https://market.agirails.io/skills/claude-code/skill.mdandgit clone https://github.com/agirails/openclaw-skill.gitare suggested for runtime integrations.
Audit Metadata