design-mirror
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external websites to extract design tokens and subsequently modifies the user's local codebase based on that content. An attacker could host a website with malicious instructions hidden in CSS or HTML to trick the AI into making unauthorized changes to the user's application.
- Ingestion points: External HTML content is fetched via
scripts/scrape_html.shand saved to/tmp/target_page.htmlfor analysis. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to distinguish between legitimate design data and potential embedded instructions in the scraped content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify critical configuration files such as
tailwind.config.js,globals.css, and various frontend components as described inSKILL.md(Step 5) andreferences/apply-guide.md. - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the scraped data before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local bash scripts (
scripts/scrape_html.shandscripts/screenshot.sh) to interact with the Bright Data API. These scripts use thecurl -k(or--insecure) flag, which disables SSL certificate validation, making the connection vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that could potentially compromise the user's API key or the data being transmitted. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches HTML and screenshot data from arbitrary third-party URLs provided by the user using the Bright Data Web Unlocker service at
api.brightdata.com.
Audit Metadata