docx-official
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a process injection technique where C source code is generated at runtime, compiled into a shared library usinggcc, and loaded into the LibreOffice process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is used to bypass socket restrictions in sandboxed environments but constitutes high-risk dynamic execution behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/accept_changes.pyprogrammatically generates and executes LibreOffice macros (StarBasic) by writing them to a temporary profile on disk and invoking them through thesofficebinary. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as an ingestion point for untrusted data by extracting text from user-provided documents using
pandocor raw XML access. 1. Ingestion points: Document text extraction inSKILL.mdand raw XML reading inscripts/office/unpack.py. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; extracted content is interpolated into the agent's context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. 3. Capability inventory: Extensive use ofsubprocess.run()across multiple files (scripts/accept_changes.py,scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/office/validators/redlining.py) and runtime compilation capabilities. 4. Sanitization: Absent; content from external documents is processed without filtering or validation of the text itself. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components utilize
subprocess.run()to execute system tools includingpandoc,pdftoppm,git, andsoffice, which could be exploited if input handling is not strictly controlled.
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