docx-official

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py implements a process injection technique where C source code is generated at runtime, compiled into a shared library using gcc, and loaded into the LibreOffice process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This is used to bypass socket restrictions in sandboxed environments but constitutes high-risk dynamic execution behavior.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/accept_changes.py programmatically generates and executes LibreOffice macros (StarBasic) by writing them to a temporary profile on disk and invoking them through the soffice binary.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as an ingestion point for untrusted data by extracting text from user-provided documents using pandoc or raw XML access. 1. Ingestion points: Document text extraction in SKILL.md and raw XML reading in scripts/office/unpack.py. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; extracted content is interpolated into the agent's context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. 3. Capability inventory: Extensive use of subprocess.run() across multiple files (scripts/accept_changes.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py) and runtime compilation capabilities. 4. Sanitization: Absent; content from external documents is processed without filtering or validation of the text itself.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components utilize subprocess.run() to execute system tools including pandoc, pdftoppm, git, and soffice, which could be exploited if input handling is not strictly controlled.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 03:40 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — docx-official