figma
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes structured design data from Figma to generate code, which introduces a surface where malicious node metadata or variables could attempt to influence the agent's output behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through tools like
get_design_context,get_metadata, andget_figjamdescribed inreferences/figma-tools-and-prompts.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the external design data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to generate and modify application code (React + Tailwind) based on the design context.
- Sanitization: There are no explicit steps provided for the agent to sanitize or validate the external design metadata before implementation.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The configuration reference in
references/figma-mcp-config.mdsuggests persisting theFIGMA_OAUTH_TOKENenvironment variable by adding it to shell profiles like~/.zshrcor~/.bashrc. This is a standard manual setup procedure for environment persistence in a development environment.
Audit Metadata