gitops-workflow

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads a shell script from https://fluxcd.io/install.sh and pipes it directly to the shell (sudo bash) for execution. It also executes remote Kubernetes manifests from GitHub using kubectl apply.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Uses sudo bash for Flux CLI installation and performs administrative tasks such as creating namespaces, retrieving cluster secrets, and configuring RBAC and SSO.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches installation manifests from the official ArgoCD repository on GitHub and an installation script from the FluxCD website.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes user-supplied Git repository URLs and configuration paths within Kubernetes manifest templates (e.g., repoURL and path in ArgoCD Application objects).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit markers are used to differentiate between system instructions and potentially malicious content within the referenced repositories.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes kubectl, helm, and flux commands which have broad capabilities to modify cluster state and manage infrastructure.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content fetched from the external Git repositories before deployment to the cluster.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 02:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gitops-workflow