guidance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains insecure code examples where LLM-generated content is executed directly using the Python
eval()function. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.md(Pattern 4) andreferences/examples.mdwithin thereact_agentimplementation:tools = {"calculator": lambda expr: eval(expr), ...}. - The input to
eval()is generated by the agent (action_input), which can be manipulated by a user to execute arbitrary Python code, potentially leading to system compromise. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation establishes an architecture that is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its tool-use examples.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
questionand potentially externalsearchresults in thereact_agentfunction (found inSKILL.mdandreferences/examples.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The prompt interpolation does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the model from following commands embedded within the input data.
- Capability inventory: The agent examples have the ability to execute code via the
eval()function provided in the toolset. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or sandboxing of the
action_inputstring before it is passed to the execution sink. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: By using
eval(), the examples facilitate arbitrary command execution on the host environment if the LLM is tricked into generating expressions that use modules likeosorsubprocess(e.g.,__import__('os').system(...)).
Audit Metadata