langgraph
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The example code for the
calculatortool inSKILL.mduses the Pythoneval()function on theexpressionparameter. Because this parameter is supplied by the LLM based on user input, an attacker could potentially execute arbitrary Python code by providing a malicious query that the LLM transforms into a harmful expression string. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed to ingest untrusted user input into the agent's state (e.g.,
AgentStatemessages andRouterStatequeries inSKILL.md). - Ingestion points: User messages are appended to the state via the
add_messagesreducer in theagentnode, and raw queries are processed in theclassifiernode. - Boundary markers: The provided code examples do not include boundary markers or system instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities for tool execution via
ToolNode, including a tool with arbitrary code execution (eval), and conditional routing that changes agent behavior based on input content. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping of the user-supplied strings before they are processed by the LLM or tools.
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