matchms
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/importing_exporting.mddemonstrates the use ofload_from_picklefor handling preprocessed spectra. The Pythonpicklemodule is insecure against maliciously constructed data, and loading an untrusted pickle file can result in arbitrary code execution on the host machine.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes mass spectrometry data from external formats such as MGF, MSP, mzML, and JSON. These files contain metadata fields like compound names and comments that are ingested by the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the scientific data.\n - Ingestion points: Spectrum loading functions in
references/importing_exporting.mdincludingload_from_mgf,load_from_mzml,load_from_msp,load_from_json, andload_from_usi.\n - Boundary markers: The provided documentation does not use delimiters or instructions to treat metadata as untrusted content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for file system operations and network requests to scientific databases.\n
- Sanitization: Metadata processing filters like
clean_compound_nameare intended for data normalization rather than security-focused sanitization.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes functionality to fetch data from established scientific repositories. Thederive_annotation_from_compound_namefilter retrieves information from PubChem, and theload_from_usifunction fetches spectral data from metabolomics Universal Spectrum Identifier (USI) repositories.
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