pdf

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess calls to execute several well-known command-line utilities, including qpdf for document manipulation, pdftotext and pdfimages from poppler-utils, and magick for image processing.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation recommends the use of widely-used third-party libraries from official package registries, such as pypdf, pdfplumber, reportlab, pdf2image, pytesseract, pypdfium2, and pdf-lib.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF content (via text extraction and OCR). Because this external data is incorporated into the agent's context without sanitization or boundary markers, it presents a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: PDF files processed by pypdf, pdfplumber, pdftotext, and pytesseract as described in SKILL.md, forms.md, and reference.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat the extracted content as untrusted data or to use delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and perform file system writes.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not include automated sanitization of the data extracted from PDF documents before processing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py performs a runtime modification (monkeypatching) of the pypdf library's DictionaryObject.get_inherited method to adjust its behavior for specific PDF field structures.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 03:47 PM