Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess calls to execute several well-known command-line utilities, including
qpdffor document manipulation,pdftotextandpdfimagesfrompoppler-utils, andmagickfor image processing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation recommends the use of widely-used third-party libraries from official package registries, such as
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pdf2image,pytesseract,pypdfium2, andpdf-lib. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF content (via text extraction and OCR). Because this external data is incorporated into the agent's context without sanitization or boundary markers, it presents a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: PDF files processed by
pypdf,pdfplumber,pdftotext, andpytesseractas described inSKILL.md,forms.md, andreference.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat the extracted content as untrusted data or to use delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and perform file system writes.
- Sanitization: The skill does not include automated sanitization of the data extracted from PDF documents before processing.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms a runtime modification (monkeypatching) of thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod to adjust its behavior for specific PDF field structures.
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