prompt-engineering-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides templates and scripts that interpolate untrusted data directly into LLM prompts, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.\n
- Ingestion points: The
PromptTemplateclass inreferences/prompt-templates.mdand thePromptOptimizerclass inscripts/optimize-prompt.pyaccept arbitrary key-value pairs viakwargsandTestCase.inputfor rendering into final prompt strings.\n - Boundary markers: The provided template rendering logic (including the
ConditionalTemplate) does not implement or encourage the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within user-supplied data.\n - Capability inventory: The
PromptOptimizer,PromptABTest, andTreeOfThoughtimplementations are designed to automatically execute the generated prompts against an LLM using methods likeclient.complete()oropenai.ChatCompletion.create().\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping logic is present to filter or neutralize potentially malicious content within user-supplied variables before they are processed by the LLM.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill incorporates external model loading from well-known services to support semantic analysis and example selection.\n
- The
SemanticExampleSelectorandDiversityExampleSelectorinreferences/few-shot-learning.mduse thesentence_transformerslibrary to download and load theall-MiniLM-L6-v2model from Hugging Face's official repository.
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