qa-test-planner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts
scripts/create_bug_report.shandscripts/generate_test_cases.shcontain a shell command injection vulnerability. The functionprompt_inputuses theevalcommand to dynamically assign user input to variable names using the patterneval "$var_name=\"$input\"". This allows for arbitrary code execution if the input contains shell metacharacters such as backticks, dollar signs for command substitution, or semicolons. - Evidence found in
scripts/create_bug_report.sh(lines 27-38) andscripts/generate_test_cases.sh(lines 28-39). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data including feature requirements and Figma design specifications, which could be used to influence the agent's output or logic.
- Ingestion points: Feature descriptions, requirement strings, and Figma design URLs provided by the user or extracted via MCP.
- Boundary markers: The skill templates in
SKILL.mddo not utilize explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential injection patterns within the ingested requirements. - Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local disk via its bash scripts and perform network operations via the Figma MCP integration.
- Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or validation was found before interpolation into templates or shell variable assignments.
Audit Metadata