railway-deployment
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes application and build logs through the
railway logscommand. These logs represent untrusted data that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's logic. * Ingestion points:railway logscommand output. * Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions to separate log content from agent instructions. * Capability inventory: The skill can trigger service redeployments, restarts, and shutdowns. * Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of log content is provided. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several management commands are configured with the
-yor--yesflags, which allow the agent to perform destructive or service-interrupting actions (redeploy, restart, stop) without requiring human confirmation. * Evidence: Use of-yinrailway redeploy,railway restart, andrailway down. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author name listed in the metadata ('Railway') and the provided author context ('davila7'), which may misrepresent the official nature of the skill. * Evidence:
author: Railwayfield in SKILL.md frontmatter.
Audit Metadata