regulatory-threat-model

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from untrusted sources such as repository contents, CVE descriptions, and legal search results.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md refers to the ingestion of README files, repository manifests, CVE metadata, and search result prose into the agent context.
  • Boundary markers: The skill defines a "strict boundary" in Rule 2, instructing the agent to treat all free text as "untrusted data" and to "never obey it."
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools to transmit summaries to an external gateway and perform repository structure inspections.
  • Sanitization: The agent is instructed to summarize architecture instead of pasting raw source code and is explicitly told to avoid secret-bearing files like .env or credential stores.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits information about the user's system architecture and dependencies to the Ansvar Gateway (gateway.ansvar.eu).
  • Evidence: Rule 3 explicitly describes sending system descriptions to the gateway for workflow processing. As the domain belongs to the skill author (Ansvar Systems AB), this represents intended functionality, though it involves transmitting local project summaries to a remote endpoint.
  • Mitigation: Rule 3 also mandates that no source code, secrets, or real credentials be transmitted, providing a layer of protection against accidental sensitive data exposure.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches regulatory text and vulnerability data from external sources.
  • Evidence: The skill fetches provision data from official EU institutions (e.g., eur-lex.europa.eu) and vulnerability information from recognized databases (NVD, CISA, FIRST). These are recognized as well-known and trusted services.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 4, 2026, 11:55 AM