SEOAgent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill explicitly recommends downloading external software from unverified sources, specifically mentioning the npm package
@seoagent-official/seoagentand a plugin from theBaxter-Incorganization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instruction to run
npm install -g @seoagent-official/seoagent && seoagent initfacilitates the download and immediate execution of remote code on the host system. This is an unverified dependency that runs with the user's local privileges. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell commands for the user/agent to execute, including global npm installations and initialization scripts that modify the local environment.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it is designed to 'Always read existing .seoagent/ files before acting'. An attacker who can influence the content of files like
.seoagent/audit/latest.mdor.seoagent/context.md(e.g., via a malicious Pull Request or third-party script) could inject instructions that the agent would then follow in subsequent sessions. - Ingestion points: Files within the
.seoagent/directory, such asproject.md,context.md, andaudit/latest.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill treats the content of these files as authoritative context for resuming work.
- Capability inventory: The agent is encouraged to perform file reads/writes, execute npm commands, and perform site audits (network/tool requests).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the workspace file content is described.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata