SEOAgent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill explicitly recommends downloading external software from unverified sources, specifically mentioning the npm package @seoagent-official/seoagent and a plugin from the Baxter-Inc organization.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instruction to run npm install -g @seoagent-official/seoagent && seoagent init facilitates the download and immediate execution of remote code on the host system. This is an unverified dependency that runs with the user's local privileges.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell commands for the user/agent to execute, including global npm installations and initialization scripts that modify the local environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it is designed to 'Always read existing .seoagent/ files before acting'. An attacker who can influence the content of files like .seoagent/audit/latest.md or .seoagent/context.md (e.g., via a malicious Pull Request or third-party script) could inject instructions that the agent would then follow in subsequent sessions.
  • Ingestion points: Files within the .seoagent/ directory, such as project.md, context.md, and audit/latest.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill treats the content of these files as authoritative context for resuming work.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is encouraged to perform file reads/writes, execute npm commands, and perform site audits (network/tool requests).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the workspace file content is described.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 10, 2026, 11:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — SEOAgent