skill-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python subprocess module to execute system-level commands. Specifically, scripts/run_eval.py and scripts/improve_description.py invoke the claude CLI tool, while eval-viewer/generate_review.py uses lsof and kill for network port management.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data—such as eval prompts and feedback—and interpolates it into instructions for specialized subagents (Grader, Analyzer, and Comparator). This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided inputs in evals.json and feedback.json.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks consistent delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating external content.
  • Capability inventory: Includes file system writes, subprocess execution, and spawning of subagents.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping of external content before it is processed by the subagents.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: In scripts/run_eval.py, the skill writes temporary markdown files to the .claude/commands/ directory. Although it attempts to delete these files after testing trigger rates, an interrupted process could leave persistent skill definitions in the agent's configuration environment.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates markdown command files and subagent prompts at runtime, which are then interpreted or executed by the agent environment, particularly during the trigger optimization loop.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 03:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-creator