skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python
subprocessmodule to execute system-level commands. Specifically,scripts/run_eval.pyandscripts/improve_description.pyinvoke theclaudeCLI tool, whileeval-viewer/generate_review.pyuseslsofandkillfor network port management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data—such as eval prompts and feedback—and interpolates it into instructions for specialized subagents (Grader, Analyzer, and Comparator). This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: User-provided inputs in
evals.jsonandfeedback.json. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks consistent delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating external content.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system writes, subprocess execution, and spawning of subagents.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping of external content before it is processed by the subagents.
- [PERSISTENCE]: In
scripts/run_eval.py, the skill writes temporary markdown files to the.claude/commands/directory. Although it attempts to delete these files after testing trigger rates, an interrupted process could leave persistent skill definitions in the agent's configuration environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates markdown command files and subagent prompts at runtime, which are then interpreted or executed by the agent environment, particularly during the trigger optimization loop.
Audit Metadata