speech
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text to generate audio files and writes these artifacts to the local file system. This workflow creates an ingestion point for untrusted data that could be used for indirect prompt injection if the output audio or its associated metadata is later processed by other automated systems.
- Ingestion points: User-provided text passed through the
--inputor--input-filearguments inscripts/text_to_speech.pyandscripts/atlas_text_to_speech.py. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not explicitly mandate delimiters or escaping for user-supplied text within the TTS instruction specs.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network requests to external speech APIs and writes files to the
output/speech/directory. - Sanitization:
scripts/atlas_text_to_speech.pyimplements strong validation for download URLs and IP addresses to prevent SSRF, but no sanitization is performed on the input text content itself. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
SKILL.mdfrontmatter lists the author as "openai", while the platform context identifies the author as "davila7". This discrepancy in metadata, while likely an artifact of the template, could be misleading regarding the origin and maintenance of the skill.
Audit Metadata