The Agent Skills Directory

[METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata in SKILL.md identifies the author as "openai", which contradicts the provided author context of "davila7". This discrepancy is deceptive and could mislead users regarding the origin and trustworthiness of the skill.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in SKILL.md define a workflow for rendering spreadsheets into visual formats using system commands. It explicitly suggests using soffice (LibreOffice) for PDF conversion and pdftoppm (Poppler) for PNG generation, which involves executing shell commands with variable paths.
[PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's documentation includes instructions for the user or agent to install system-level utilities using sudo apt-get install, which requires elevated privileges in Linux environments.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external data from .xlsx, .csv, and .tsv files, creating an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in a spreadsheet could influence the agent's behavior.
Ingestion points: External files are loaded using the openpyxl and pandas libraries, with data being read into the agent's execution context.
Boundary markers: While SKILL.md states that system and user instructions take precedence, there are no explicit delimiters or boundary markers implemented in the scripts to isolate untrusted data from the agent's control logic.
Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the file system (wb.save), create directories (mkdir), and execute shell commands for file rendering.
Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic to filter potentially malicious content from the spreadsheet data before processing.

spreadsheet