vercel-deploy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The fallback script
scripts/deploy.sharchives the local project directory (excluding.git,node_modules, and.envfiles) into a tarball and uploads it via a POST request tohttps://codex-deploy-skills.vercel.sh/api/deploy. This constitutes a significant transfer of project source code to an external, non-standard service endpoint. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell commands and a local bash script (
scripts/deploy.sh) to perform file system operations (staging, archiving) and network communication. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly direct the agent to requestsandbox_permissions=require_escalatedif network calls are blocked, which increases the attack surface by bypassing default sandbox network restrictions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a data ingestion surface by reading and parsing local
package.jsonfiles and processing JSON responses from the external deployment server. The resulting URLs are returned to the user, creating a path for a potentially malicious server to inject deceptive links or instructions into the agent's output. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlto send data to an external API and subsequently performs polling requests to the generated preview URL to check deployment status, despite instructions inSKILL.mdadvising against fetching the deployed URL.
Audit Metadata